Western Europe and Japan: Trade War or Trade Peace.  Congressional Record, proceedings and debates of the 91st Congress, first session. Volume 115, No. 187, 13 November 1969 by Javits, Mr.
:" 
,. 
.I 
... 
United States 
of America 
Vol. 115 
)· 
. ongrrssional Record 
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF TH.B 9 I si CONGRESS. FIRST SESSION 
WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1969 No. 187 
people to the a.t least pa.rtial neglect Qf 
a. world of 3 ~~ billion people. For, this 
results in a. tendency to overlook the fact 
tha.t the very economic premlres that 
have governed our relationships with 
other industrialized countries of the 
world are changing before our eyes. 
A basic premise of our foreign eco-
nomic i>olicy during the 1960's was to 
work for the integration of Europe 
through the expansion o! the European 
Common Market to include the United 
Kingdom and the other countries of the 
Outer Seven-which we still desire. The 
1960's, through the Kennedy round, also 
moved the United States forward on the 
road of trade liberalization., Arid we alSo 
maintain a susta.lned commitment to· 
·foreign economic assistance for national 
security and moral reasons. 
But while the United States was fight-
ing p1. Vietnam, events in Europe and 
Ja~ have altered the economic foun-
___ .....,.;:...t dations of this policy. Some Amertcan 
WESTE&N EUROPE AND JAPAN: pollcymakers · are now pondering the 
TRADE WAR OR TRADE PEACE question of whether expansion Qf the 
Mr. JA VITS. Mr. President, I speak 
today because early next week the Prtme 
Minister of Japan, Mr. Sato, will be here 
on a very important mission having to do 
with futw·e trade, and because we have just had a report from the President re-
lating to trade with Latin Am~rica that 
made some very historic proposals. 
I have just been to the North Atlantic 
Assembly meeting as cha.l.rman of its 
Political Committee where the question 
of the access of U.S. products to the 
Common Market has met with very great 
resistance. So we are beading up to what 
may very well be an historic test in re-
, spect to the trade policy of the United 
States. 
I have, therefore, felt that this was the 
moment to make some recommendations 
and propose some ideas in this field with 
which for some two decades I have been 
very intensely occupied. 
In our foreign relations, public at-
tention and public debate continue to 
I focus on Vietnam. Unfortunately, only an unusual event brings our rela.tioru; with Europe, Japan, Latin America, or ~ • the other countries of the free world to 
I 
l 
I 
I 
the front pages of our press. We pay a 
dear price for this practice of concen-
trating so much attention and so much 
ell'ort on a divided co~mtry of 17 m1ll1on 
I.-
~ 
l 
l 
EEC is il}.~si in tba-U.S. nationa.tJJ!.-
terest,..<And looking across the Pacific, 
-m:eforthcoming visit of Prime Minister. 
Sato will highlight our growing economic 
problems with Japan. 
As the 1960's marched by, two funda-
mental structural changes have taken 
place. 
First, the United States lost its trade 
surplus, and became a deficit nation 
with an overall balance-of-payments 
deficit running to an order of magni-
tude o! $4 billion annually. This year, 
this deficit was held to this level only 
because of the unusually heavy 1nfiux 
of capital to take advantage of high U.S. 
interest rates-a condition that is tem-
porary, It thus can be said the $4 billion 
:figure understates rather than over-
states the seriousness of our position: 
and a deficit in the U.S. balance-of-pa.y-
ments position of up to $10 billion an-
nually is being freely forecast. 
As the United States has moved from 
a surplus to a deficit position-and this 
movement is another legacy of the Viet-
nam 'lvar---support for liberal trade and 
aid policies was eroded. A nation, like a 
household, has less f.reedom of action 
and can be less liberal as the bank ac-
count-the surplus-is drawn down. The 
second car becomes a luxury that can 
no longer easily be eJiorded-and this 
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second car as we all know frequently 
bears a Japanese or West German trade-
mark. In a deficit situation, aid programs 
also are increasingly viewed as expend-
able expenditures, and the expansion of 
our gross national product is now being 
matched by our shrinking outlays for 
foreign economic assistance to the de-
veloping nations of the world. We rank 
not first but eighth in the list of indus-
trialized countries granting aid-in 
terms of development assistance as a 
percentage of GNP. 
The shrinkage in the trade surplus is 
also directly connected with the growth 
of protectionist pressures in the United 
States. This pressure has grown to the 
point that the Emergency Committee for 
American Trade has warned: 
This year 1969 could be remPmbered-Uke 
the year 1029-aa the date that a trade war 
began-the second of the 20th century. Tne 
first shot 1n a. new trade wa.r might be fired 
at a.ny moment-here In the United States or 
In France or In Great Brltaln-ln any coun-
try' where new restrictions on Imports are 
Imposed. 
It is clear that the troops for such a 
trade war have been mobilized. Over 70 
Senators recently sent a petition to the 
President requesting action against ris-
ing shoe imports. If the forthcoming ne-
gotiations with Japan do not bear fruit, 
the trade war may open-a trade war 
that would be declared by the Congress. 
The omens are clear. I refer in particular 
to S. 2885---a bill to establish an "orderly 
trade" in textiles and in leather foot-
wear-a quotas bill. That textiles may 
become the battleground will particularly 
distress our European and Japanese 
friends since they are convinced that a 
sound economic case for a comprehen-
sive, bilateral agreement establishing 
quotas has not been made. 
This brings me to the second major 
change that has occurred. 
S.eQol11LJ In the same time span that 
the tJiilted States was moving Into a 
deficit position, the economic policies of 
'the Common Market have become more 
protectionis~ and those of Japan have 
not moved toward the liberalization 
which logically could be expected. As a 
result, these nations must bear partial 
responsiblll:ty for the mobilization of 
protectionist forces within the United 
States. 
f 
I regret that the European Common 
Market 18 increasingly taking on the ap-
pearance of a narrow, inward-looking 
protectionist bloc whose trade policies as 
they atl.'ect agricultural as well as indus-
trial products increasingly discriminate 
against nonmembers. 
The Europeans know well the concern 
existing in the United States and among 
American exporters over the system of 
border tax adJustments. The use of these 
border tax adJustments, which combine 
a tax on imports and a tax rebate system 
for exports, erects barriers to trade which 
work to the dlsadvantage of U.S. ex-
porters. 
Other examples of potentially restric-
tive arrangements include the French, 
British, and West Germa.n move toward 
the establishment of a system of com-
mon standarda for electrical components 
that could serve to restrict trade, and 
the hl.gbb- restrtct.lve European textlle 
import quota system which has the net I join in Dr. Malmgrcn's warning U1nt 
effect of channeling increased textile these developments are not only harmful 
flows to U.S. shores. More open Euro- enough by themselves, but that there 
pean government procurement proced- is the clear and present danger that the 
ures are also very much in order since practice will spread. It is also clear that 
the present system has the effect of ex- U.S. pollcymakers wm consider the 
eluding competitive bidding by the evolving natw-e of the Common Market, 
·United States and other suppliers. as they develop the U.S. posture toward 
These trade policies in the industrial moves presently underway to enlarge the 
tleld, which are moves toward protection- EEC. The question must be posed of 
ism, are serious, but the implications of · whether U.S. policymakers might indeed 
the EEC's common agricultural policies, not be compelled by U.S. sentlmellt to 
CAP, are overwhelming. If pursued, the shift their support away from enlarge-
CAP's policies of high agricultural sup- ment of the EEC if the economic price 1n 
port prices combined with no limitations terms of U .S. trade particularly in the 
on production could score a. knockout field of agriculture were too hi&h. 
punch not only to the world agricul- Turning to another facet of EEC-trade 
tural market structure, as we presently policy, it is regrettable that just as a. 
know it, but also to the possibility of the major diplomatic effort was underway to 
nlted States continuing the liberal trade negotiate a system whereby all indus-
policles that this Nation has pursued over trialized countries of tl1e free world 
the past 25 years. Western Europe should would agree to grant generalized, non-
now from a friend that the CAP as 1t res:iprocal, nondiscriminatory taxiff pref-
is presently constituted' runs the risk erences to the products of all developing 
of alienating the U.S. farm bloc which countries, the EEC opened negotiations 
traditionally has had a liberalizing effect with Spain pointing toward the estab-
on U.S. trade policy. Such alienation of lishment of another comprehensive hi-
support could be decisive. lateral preferential trade agreement. 
Dr. llarold B. Malmgren, formerly of Recent preferential trade agreements 
the White House's Trade Office, in a re- negotiated or renegotiated by the 
cent widely publicized speech, eloquentl)" EEC include the Yaounde agreement, 
outlined the case against this common the agreement with the East African 
agricultural policy of the EEC. His words communities, and an agreen1ent '\\1th 
are worth recalling: Tunisia and Morocco. Most of these 
Defenders of the Common Agricultural agreements cover a wide range of prod-
Policy have sometimes argued that the level uct..o:;-agricultural and industrial--and 
ot exports from the U.S. and other countries the Yaounde agreement even extends re-
would continue to rise. In spite ot the sys- verse preferences to EEC products in 
tem. They believed Internal demand would . ta1n 1 continue to grow fast enough to offset the Afncan markets. Ya.ounde con s t 1e 
damaging effects of the Import levies. Until carrot of $918 million 1n developmentnl 
1065-66 this did In tact happen. But subSe- assistance over the life of the agreement. 
quently, after the full system fell Into place In my opinion, all these agreements are 
tor many products, there hBB been a reversal. inward looking and benefit only the in-
In the last three years, u.s. !Ann exports to group to tlle exclusion of other develop-
the EEO have fallen nearly 20 percent. The ing and developed states. It also seems 
Items subject t~ the variable lmport levy clear that they tend to erode the Gen-
sy.stem amounted to $736,000,000 In 1065-66; 
In 1968-69 they were $441,000,000. They tell, eral Agreement on Tartft's and Trade and 
In other words, nearly 40 percent. the principle of most-favored-nation 
Th1s 1s not the whole picture, however. treatment. It is also clear that these dis-
Whlle Increasing Its Import protect1on, the criminatocy agreements do not strength-
EEO has simultaneously been raising Its en liberal trade forces in the United 
level of domestic !arm production. This has States. 
resulted In Increasing need to unload sur-
pluses In world m.a.rkets at heavUy subs!- In light of these facts, President· 
dlzcd, d1stres8 prices. Export sub&ldl~tlon Nixon's statement on preferences made 
has been used more and more aggressively, when Governor Rockefeller's rePOrt on 
In a wide range of products, Including poul- Latin Ainerica was released is a logical 
try, lard, dairy products, barley and now sequence. The President said: 
wheat. Thus the workJngs of the Common If the type of International agreement pro-
Agricultural Pollcy have resulted In reduced posed by the United states could not be 
Imports, Increased production, and Mtlll- negotiated within a..rea.sonsble time, then the 
olally assisted exportation. Obviously, this United states will be prepared to consider 
means Increased compet1tlon !or other ex- other altenmtlve actions tt can take to as-
porters In remaining markets and a down- sure that the American nations wm have 
ward pressure on world prices. preferential access to the u.s. market. These developments would be harmful 
enough by themselves. But there Is llke11- The significance of this proposal can-
hOOd that the practice wlll spread. not be overestimated. It moves the world 
The CAP policies strangely have not one step further away from the principle 
even benefited Europe. Dr. Malmgren of most-favored-nation treatme~t in 
notes: · trade and toward the further prolifel"a-
tion of regional trading !n"oups; and 
once the United States steps down this 
road, the process will be difficult to l"e-
verse. Such a development will have pro-
found implications in the political sphere 
also. World policymakers should now 
carefully pause and look ahead into the 
future and decide what path they should 
follow . and consider what shape tl1ey 
wish the world to take for the remainder 
of this decade. I would greatly prefer 
our following the path whereby all the 
It may surprise you, but the total costa 
to the &lx member countries of the Common 
Agricultural Policy run a.bout 14 to 15 bll-
11on U.S. dollars annually. About $8-bllllon 
dollars o! this Is accounted tor by govern-
ment spend·lng and $6- to $7-bllllon Is ac-
counted tor by costs to consumers resulting 
tram artificially high prices. At this junc-
ture with farm surpluses building up ra.p-
1dly, and the costs skyrocketing, you would 
1ih.lnk that; the European Commission would 
admit that the system baa not worked well, 
and. m UBi be restnroturecl. 
/ 
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industrial nations of the world grant 9.3 percent and the institution of a direct could prove embarrassing to both Gov-
nonreciprocal, nondl.scrlminatory gen- farm subsidy system. This contrasts with ernments to derail an agreement with 
eralized trade preferences to the develop- the community's inability to adjust Euro- Japan. 
ing world. This clearly 1s also the w1sh of pean agricultural prices when the franc I view it of high importance that the 
the developing world including Latin was devalued. change in the status of Okinawa should 
Amertca as the UNCTAD conferences Chancellor Brandt's statements on -not only take into account defense con-
and the Consensus of V1na del Mar have trade also indicate that West Gennany siderations, but als.o should be accom-
made abundantly clear. has indeed come of age. · panied by Japanese trade and investment 
Again, looking across the Pacific, I He stated: liberalization. In this way, the negotia-
must observe the apparent double stand- The world can expect o! an economically tions over Okinawa would be creative 
ard which has resulted in a. Japanese strong country such as ours a liberal foreign leading to a greater two-way fiow of 
trade surplus in relation to the United trade pollcy designed to promote. the trade trade and investment. In my opinion, it 
States of more than a billion dollars an- ot all countries. We contribute t6we.rd this would be a serious mistake to use the 
nually for 2 years running. I must point end by our pollcy and by our participation forthcoming bargaining over the change 
Out that trade is a two-wa.y street, and 1n all organizations dealing with world trade. in status of Okinawa to press Japan uni-We tend to promote our trade with the de-
that continuance of such a. billion-dollar veloplng countries and here I mention but laterally to impose comprehensive quotas 
surplus 1s unsustainable-both politi- the universe.! preferences tor commodities .on its textile exports to the United States. 
cally and economically. This 1s particu- from the developing countries. Regarding our textile problem, let the 
larly true since more than any other United States, Japan and other inter-
nation in the free world, Japan has Finally, I applaud the statement that ested nations rather sit down in Geneva 
the enlargement of the European corn- d h 
erected the most severe nontarilf barriers m unity must come and the movement to- un er t e rules of the GATT and negoti-
to goods and capital. Since the war, our ward this end at the recent EEC Foreign ate a fAir and just multilateral agree-
corporations have actively promoted U.S. ment-fair and Just to our textile in-
sales in the Japanese market, but have Ministers' meeting in Brussels. Chancel- dustry as well as to exporting nations. 
been faced with continued and, in my lor Brandt stated: It is against this background that the 
view, increasingly unjustified trade and The Community needs Great Brltan as foreign economic policy of the United 
much as other appllcant countries. In the Stat 1s b in investment barriers. For example, whLle chorus ot European voices, the voice of Brit- es e g formulated. As indicated 
even Japanese tarilf schedules are rela- e.ln must not be missing, unless Europe wants earlier, President Nixon has now made 
tively high and restrictive-particularly to tntUct harm on herself. clear the alternative to OECD accept-
on luxury items, chemicals and ma- . ance of a generalized system of tarilf 
chlnery-the greatest discrimination I urge the countri~ of tlle Common preferences for the developing countries. 
continues to be the non-tarilf regulations ' Market to take . cogruzance of the new The negotiating authority of the Trade 
imposed or perpetuated by the Japanese fresh winds blowmg from :West Germany, Expansion Act has expired, and the full 
Government. The more substantive of I ask that these countries· ponder the tarilf cuts won in the Kennedy round 
in . . possible grim alternatives to the libera.l will h b i 1 ,these ~a~iers to free trade elude. First, t de P licies proposed by Chancellor ave een mp emented by Janu-
quantitative import controls, many of ra 0 ary 1, 1972. It is likely that the trade bill 
which are on agricultural products; sec- Brandt. . the administration will send to the Con-
ond, restrictive licensing requirements; Regarding Japa.n, there is evidence gress in the near future will not be more 
third, sizable commodity taxes on auto- ~hat pressures. withi? J~pan for trade !1-nd than a holding action-meaning that it 
mobiles and liquor which alfect Imports mvestment liberahzation are ~rowmg. will not request the authority to engage 
more severely than domestic production; There is hope that mutually satisfactory in negotiations leading to additional 
fourth, a prior import deposit require- arrangements-whose elements may well tariff reductions. The bill is likely to -
ment of 1 percent or 5 percent which can inc~ude Japanese_ trade and inv.estment contain proposals for liberalizing escape 
be disastrous to the importer when credit pollcy and U.S. policy toward Okmawa..- clause procedures which are necessary 
is tight or profits are slim; and fifth, a will emerge from the forthcoming visit and may request negotiating authority in 
widespread system of state trading. In of Prime Minister Sato. respect to nontarilf barriers. I am con-
the investment area, U.S. investment in I find it encouragi~g that the Ja~_>anese cerned that liaison between the executive 
many fields is either prohibited or se- are. apparent~y willmg to ~egotiate a and legislative branches on these crucial 
verely restricted. The impact of these re- limited, selecti:ve understandmg gov~m- trade questions are not yet close enough 
strictions varies according to the prod- ing their texti~e exp.orts to the Uruted and that we are not yet working in con-
ucts and the barriers they face, but a.ll States. I ~o not ,feel that the economic cert. 
contribute substantially to Japan's facts justifY the ,UniU:d States pressing In the near future, the Joint Economic 
growing trade advantage over the United for a .comprehensive, bllateral agreement Committee will open crucial hearings on 
States. Unfortunately, liberalization at this time. Such a posture would make U.S. trade, aid, and investment policies 
moves have taken place at a very slow agreem~nt difficult, would have unfavor- which will have an important molding 
pace and have not been significant. I able political repercussion~ in Jap.an and elfect on any trade legislation which 1s 
think we have reached the point where co~d even alfect. Japan~ relatlOnship likely to emerge in the early 1970's. The 
the alternatives are clear: Japan needs With friendly Asian natlOns-auch as hearings of the Joint Economic Commit-
to liberalize trade and investment or South Korea, Taiw~n, and Hong Kong~ tee played a similar role during the early 
Japan will increasingly encounter such which ar~ also textile exporting nations, 1960's before the Trade Expansion Act 
restrictions in foreign markets as Japan and possibly could encourage.~apan and was ilitroduced. Presidential task forces 
has erected to insulate its own market. Western Europe ~ take additional re- on trade and aid will also be working and 
Fortunately, the international trade strictive steps agamst our exports. making their recommendations early 
slate 1s not totally black and measures This brings me to the issue of. the . next year. It is fair to say that the eco-
can still be taken before full and irrevoc- ~ange ~ the status of Okinawa which nomic and trade policies of Europe and 
able mobilization of protectionist forces Wlll ?e discussed durin~ Prime Minister Japan will help determine the eventual 
1s ordered. . Sato s visit to the Umted States next shape of our policies. They will also help 
I applaud not only the words but also week. The Senate has Just passed a reso- determine the actions of the 9lst Con-
the actions of Chancellor Wllly Brandt ~~tlon which I opposed which held that gress in the months ahead. 
in the short time ~e has been in office. it is the sense of the Senate that any Finally, I would like again to turn to 
No one can question the Chancellor's agreement ~r understanding entered into the words of Donald M. Kendall, dis-
words that by the reevaluation of the by the PreSldent to change the status of tinguished business leader and chair-
West Gennan mark "we have made a any territory referred.to in article Ill of man of the Emergency Committee_ for 
major contribution in the foreign trade the Treaty of Peace Wlth Japan shall not American Trade when he said in Jan-
sector toward further liberalization of take elfect without the advice and con- f this ear' . 
· sent of the Senate " uary o Y · world trade and toward stab1lizlng the · . What the world needs now Is trade peace, 
international monetary system." No one I opposed this res.olut1on since I felt not trade war 
can fail to admire the political courage- that its rationale was not protection of · 
ousness of the decision to reduce West the Senate's prerogatives in the area of It remains for all parties to construct 
German agricultural support prices Jl::v foreign alfairs but rather an etrort that such a. trade peace-Particularly when 
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the omens seems to be pointing in the 
other direction. I also believe that U In-
deed the first shots of a trade war al-
ready have been fired, they were not 
fired by the United States. The opening 
salvos perhaps are represented by the 
Japanese billion-dollar trade surplus for •. 
2 years running and the movement of 
the European Common Market toward 
protectionism. The time is short before 
American defensive actions acoelerate. 
To Europe and Japan I say in effect:. "It 
is your choice." · 
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 
Mr. JAVITS. I yield. 
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I commend 
the Senator from New York for his com- ' · 
ments. He has long been an ~ponent of · 
freer trade, a policy supported by every 
administration we have had in Wash-
ington since the days of the Smoot-Haw-
ley tariffs. We saw the calamitous con-
sequences of that high tariff policy 
which shut off the United.States from 
world markets and kept all countries 
from having the economic benefits that 
freer trade offers. 
I would like to indicate that I related 
the very spirit and words of the distin-
guished Senator's message, in company 
with Ambassador Armin Meyer, to Mr. 
Aichi, Foreign Minister of Japan, before 
he left for the Soviet Union. I tried to 
point out to him that Japan no longer 
can claim it is a'developing nation. It 
no longer needs protection on imports. 
Rather it is now a powerful economic 
force. It has broad markets throughout 
the world. It has a huge balance-of-pay-
ments surplus and it must now respond 
as a developed nation rather than as a 
developing nation. It cannot expect to 
export steel to the United States and 
then limit imports going into Japan 
which have steel in them, such as refrig-
erators, automobiles, or whatever they 
maybe. 
They must recognize that if a trade 
war starts, they would be the country 
most severely penalized because every 
country would retaliate against Japan, just as the European Economic Commu-
nity cannot expect to impose tariffs on 
soybeans and not expect retaliation. 
Mr. President, I congratulate the Sen-
ator on his message urging peaceful trade 
relations rather than a trade war, and ' 
attempting to lay a foundation for those 
trade relations. 
Mr. JA VITS. Mr. President, I am : 
grateful to the SenatQr, and I thank him I 
for his endorsement. His comments are l 
most gratifying. _ 
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Dear Senator Javits, 
Brussels, 
ER/jds 
25th N vember 1969 
us- c_ m. 
rfr c oCrz o& ?J-e 
The statement which you made on november 13 before COngress on trade 
war or trade peace has received a good deal of attention in this part. of the 
world. After having had a chance of reading the entire text· in the 
congressional record I cannot r~ from making a few comments, parti-
cularly with respect to What you said about trade policies pursued by the 
EIDC. Indeed, noidng seems to me more important at the present ~~ 
of relations between the United States and Europe than to discuss, in open 
and frank talks, problems of common concern. Such discussions will not 
always produce an identity of views. But they can at least contribute to 
increase our mutual understanding of each other's problemsn and attitudes 
and wipe out a certain number of misunderstanding_ Which, by becoming part 
of public opinion, might exert a dangerous influence on policy decisions 
taken by either of us. 
In your speech you accused the Common Market economic policies of havine 
become more protectionist, both in the field of industrial and agricultural 
products. You will no doubt understand that I simply cannot go along wth that 
statem.ant beca.use'I thiuk,i t is not true. Let me therefore take f.i the 
major points one by one in the same "?lt:J'hrt order in which you :reniutixthem.J 
Wit£.. regards to the so-called "border taxes" I would like to draw your a.ttentior 
to the fact that the sa.me ·taxes on imports and tax rebates on exports which 
you consider as a trade barrie~ to US products apply also within the EEC, withov 
there being the slightest discrimination. As you may know, our value added tax 
is being levied a at. every stage of industry and commerce lihile in the . 
United States consumption taxes are levied practically only at the retail level. 
It is due to this difference in the method of tax collection that the EEC ;" 
countries have to proceed to tax compensation~ at the border ~tor all its 
imports and exporta,while the United States has to do so only for very few 
products like automobiles. 
. .; .. 
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In any case, it is inadmissible to consider our tax compensation at the 
border as a. trade barrier. ~Phis has become increasingly clear in the 
discussions that have gone on for months i~he GATT sub-committee created 
tor that purpose;and the US Ad:ninistration has also, after long hesitatio 
embraced this point ot view. ror your personnal information I am joining 
a copy of "European Community", September 1969 in which we published an 
artiole concerning some misunderstanding with regards-to "border taxes". 
/ 
' . 
. - . ' . .· ' ~. . ·.\ 
- 3 
You attribute to •the high~ restrictive European textile import 
quota system" the increased textile flows to u.s. shores,"Bowe~~~-you 
look at the evolution ot imports since 1960, you will be surpri~t, 
.;); despite -=r "highly restrictive quota system"~ EEC imports from third 
countries have been growing consistently faster than US iDports of textiles 
In the case of the US the average annual growth rate of imports \~ 
10,5 %between 1~60 and 1~68 co~pared to 12,3 % tor the EECj 4ad Uhile 
textile i~ErNs into the Community have increased substantially faster 
than •••~ import a, this was not the case in the US. The rapid increase 
ot our textile imports is not surprising. Indeed, we have continuously 
worked towards removing our quantitative restrictions. TodaT these hit 
only a very limited number ot items imported from an equally limitod number 
of countries, the majority of textile products being completely liberalised. 
One should also not overlook that, While the ijBO countries still maintain 
some quantitative restrictions, EEC duties ~ textile products are on the 
average 20 % to 30 % lower than those im~osed by the United States. 
As far a.s government procurement is concerned, I would ~ike to 
make only two remarks. First, the~e is so far no European procurement 
system. Any discrimination that exists in this sector,and I will certainly 
not deny~ ~~~~~istenoe of such discrimination, hits evenly ever,y oupplier 
outside the~ountr,r Uhich invites bids, Whether European or American. 
Secondly, procurement procedures favoring national industries have always 
existed in all countries. They have nothing to do with economic p0licies 
of the Common Market. The EEC has been trying for years, with little 
success so far, to abolish any statutory discrimination& between member 
• 1 I tJL.t1' re.~-
countries• :;.~~c. 'Ve. a.reV.W 1~ to discuss this problem in the context of 
world-wide negotiations on non-tariff barriers • 
This bringt me to our agricultural policy. I am fully aware of the 
repercussions ~oh our policy in this field ma7 have on US exports of 
certain agricultural commodities. There is not muoh use in arguing 
statistics and pointing out that wnile us agricultural exports to the 
• 
Community fell by nearly 20 from their pRak level o£ ~ 1,6 billion in 
1965/66, they are still ..._ some 80 %higher than in 1958. 
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Nor do I insist on the fact that almost half ot US agricultural 
exports to the Community are either subject t~--~ duties, lev~ or o»her res-
trictions at all, as is the case partiourlarl~lseeds oil cakms, corn by-. 
produots,cotton,h1des and skins 1or to ver,r a moderate pr~tion, as is the 
oaee ;;or dried fruit and vegatablea, v egeta.ble oils. Finally I shall not 
~~. upon the restrictive import system the Uriited States, despita its 
highly efficient agriculture, has to maintain in favor of US dairy} meat e..nd 
oilseed products. 
£~ 
I think the issue is basically of political nature and has to~dged 
as such. The political question simply is how fast we can transform the 
~upea.nJ Bommuni ty into an efficient economic sector. Most European 
countries have a oen~ old tradition of agricultural protection. When 
we started fo~ •• the !ommon 1';tarket in 1958,our~egaoy was ~-~~ul : 
too many people in agriculture,fra.,jlllentated la.ndholdingi low productivity, 
insufficient use of fertilizers, m~ohinery and pe~tioide, low inoomesxm!Y~ 
compared to other sectors of the economy, varying but generally high degroc 
of protection. The Rome Traaty imposed upon us to create a common market for 
agricultural products and to assure farmers an adequate income. So we had to 
fix a common level of support for the whole community. This support is nd 
higb~r than the average ot national support levels, for ijEC prices were fixed 
someWhere between the highest and the lowest mark. It is therefore simply 
not true, contr&r,J to What Dr. Makgren claims, that our prices or our 
protection are three times • high{ 3t'they were in 1960. This js not to imply 
that some prices have not been fixed at too high a level,considering the 
explosion of agricultural productivity an4 production unich most of us 
under-estimated in the beginning of pahafnpKJliDJbrr the sixties. But :ts it is 
easy to criticise and to overlook the tremendous political pressure for a11 
even higher price level within the Community. I remind you in this connection 
~ 
that in spite of 4,5 million JIB Jleople having lef~iculture since 1958, 
in France one in six, in Italy evE,n one in five occupied persons is still 
depending on acrioulture tor his living. It is also not sufficiently known 
outside the Community that our ta1mers have openly expressed their miscontent 
with what they consider an inadeqt.ate support level by organising riots a.nd 
by refusing to further collaborate with the respective government or community 
institutions. we simply cannot close our eyes before the enormous amount 
of social unrest that exists t!D among our farmers. 
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Under these circumstances it will prove ver,r difficult indeed 
to have adopted even relatively modest measures like the reduction 
in wheat sug~r and butter prices Which the 66mmiesion just proposed 
to the Council. ' 
'Hhen, 15 yea.rs ago i;he United States was confronted with similar 
proplems, it was fortuna.toly in a. more favor~~t~~ the EEC 
and pratically a.ll other developed countries ·, when they try to cope 
with the "a.gricul tu:ral }10duction revolution" that seems to be inlJVi table 
at a certain stage of economic development. Indeed, the United States 
could still use its agrictutural surpluses to build up markets in Europe, 
in the less ~ deVEJloped countries and even in the central market 
economies. Tod.c'ly the scopH for "food aid" is muoh more limited, because 
the world market is saturated and the LDC's themselves cannot absorb 
all the eurpluseo tiithout endangering their·ov.n agricultural produotion:Jl 
Whatever the difficulties ahead, in the Community wa are resolved to 
settle our surplus problettsJ and we are also ready to discuss with the 
United States and all other interested parties what constructive measures 
can be taken to solve the difficulties that confront ..X all of us in 
the world markets. 
